In the post Lehman period, the interest rate of the US dollar became low on the forward contract because of its role as international currency. However, in the Euro crisis, that of the Sterling pound became equally low, while the other European currencies increased its liquidity premium. By using secured rates, the following analysis examines why the Sterling pound and the Danish kroner showed asymmetric features in the two crises. The regression results suggest that there was a structural break in the determinants of deviations from covered interest parity (CIP) condition across the European currencies during the crises. Currency-specific money market risk was critical in explaining the deviations in the GFC, while EU banks' credit risk were useful in explaining the deviations in the Euro crisis. The asymmetry explains different features between the Sterling pound and the Danish kroner in the two crises.
Introduction
The global financial crisis (GFC) and the following Euro crisis had enormous impacts on international markets. In particular, covered interest parity (CIP) condition, which was solidly anchored in riskless arbitrage during tranquil periods, was violated substantially during the crises.
Even using secured rates such as overnight index swap (OIS) rates, the violation was substantial in the crises. In particular, when comparing interest rates across currencies, the CIP condition suggests that the US dollar had lower interest rate than any other currency in the crisis. yen. For the sample period from January 2, 2006 to November 24, 2015, we calculated deviations from the CIP condition by the annualized value of (1+i n t ) -(1+i us t ) (F n t+1 /S n t ), where i n t is three-month currency n's OIS rate, i us t is three-month US dollar OIS rate, S n t is the spot exchange rate between the two currencies, and F n t+1 is its three-month forward exchange rate. For all combinations, deviations from the CIP condition had been negligible until the beginning of August 2007. But significant upward deviations had occurred since mid-August 2007. In particular, there were very large upward deviations after the Lehman shock on September 15 in 2008. The upward deviations were temporarily stabilized in 2009. But reflecting the Euro crisis, we can still observe significant upward deviations from 2010 to 2012 and in 2015. Money that provides with liquidity has lower interest rate than any other safe asset. In the global crises, the role of the US dollar as international liquidity similarly made its interest rate lower than those of the other major currencies on the forward market.
However, when comparing interest rates across the other currencies, we can see that the Sterling pound had smaller deviations than the other major currencies after the early 2009. In particular, since the second half of 2010, the Sterling pound came to have equally low interest rate as the US dollar on the forward contract. In contrast, the other European currencies and the Japanese yen had higher interest rates in the Euro crisis. Figure 2 depicts daily CIP deviations of the Euro from three European currencies and the Japanese yen from January 2, 2006 to November 24, 2015. For currency k (k = the Sterling pound, the Swiss franc, the Danish kroner, and the Japanese yen), we calculated deviations of the CIP conditions by the annualized value of (1+ i k t ) -(1+i euro t )(f k t+1 /e k t ),
where i k t is three-month currency k's OIS rate, i t euro is three-month Euro OIS rate, e k t is the Euro spot exchange rate against currency k, and f k t+1 is its three-month forward exchange rate. All of the data the unit of which is basis point are downloaded from Datastream. Even when we use the Euro as the benchmark currency, we can see significant positive deviations in the Swiss franc, the Danish kroner, and the Japanese yen in the figure. The upward deviations which became largest after the Lehman shock still persisted in the Euro crisis. In contrast, the Sterling pound showed negative deviations throughout the period. In particular, the downward deviations were widened in the second half of 2011 when the Euro crisis became more serious. The results imply that in the Euro crisis, the Euro remained chosen as a regional liquidity among non-Euro members in Europe but that the Sterling pound was preferred more than the Euro in the international money markets. 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2013 . It indicates that the UK share has been twice as large as the US share and has been much larger than the other shares. In particular, Baba and Packer (2009a,b) find that deviations from covered interest parity were negatively associated with the creditworthiness of European and US financial institutions.
The authors such as Fong, Valente, and Fung (2010) and Coffey, Hrung, and Sarkar (2009) show that in addition to credit risk, liquidity and market risk played important roles in explaining the deviations. Grioli and Ranaldo (2010) find that the results were essentially the same even if we used secured rates such as OIS. Fukuda (2012) finds that in the GFC, the Tokyo market had larger deviations than the London and the New York markets even though Japanese banks were more sound and healthy than EU and US banks. The following analysis confirms some of the findings in previous studies, especially those based on secured rates. However, unlike previous studies, this analysis pays a special attention to different features across several European currencies before and after the Euro crisis which has not been discussed extensively in literature.
One important implication of this paper is that the degree of liquidity risk is not necessarily 1 In July 2012, Danish central bank adopted a special monetary policy to set some of its policy rate below zero. But our sample does not include this special period.
related with economic fundamentals such as banking sector's soundness. Denmark and Switzerland are European countries that had relatively sound economic fundamentals in the Euro crisis. However, due to strong linkages to the Euro, they suffered from Euro's liquidity shortage in the Euro crisis. In contrast, due to the fact that London is the largest money center in the world, UK did not suffer from liquidity shortage in the Euro crisis. The result is consistent with that of Fukuda (2011) who showed that in the GFC, the Tokyo market had higher liquidity risk than the London and the New York markets because the Tokyo market is less thick than the other two markets. In literature, several studies discussed money market risk in Europe in the GFC and in the Euro crisis (see, among others, Moessner and Allen (2013) ). In particular, authors such as Mindested and Risbjerg (2011) and Risbjerg and Sangill (2012) discussed the Danish money market and its liquidity in the crisis period.
Our empirical results will provide with supplementary explanations for determinants of money market risk in Europe based on information obtained from CIP conditions between the Euro and other European currencies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a basic framework of our econometric tests. After explaining how to measure counter-party credit risk and liquidity risk in Section 3, Section 4 reports the results of our regressions. Section 5 investigates their robustness allowing alternative structural breaks. Section 6 concludes and refers to the implications.
Empirical Specification
The purpose of the following sections is to examine why European currencies showed asymmetric deviations from the CIP conditions in the GFC and in the Euro crisis. Since our main interest is to compare the difference between the Euro and the other European currencies, the following analysis focuses the determinants of the CIP deviations between the Euro and the two admitted that it had misreported its official economic statistics for many years. Fears of a sovereign debt crisis then developed among investors concerning Greece's ability to meet its debt obligations. In the first few weeks of 2010, there was renewed anxiety about excessive national debt, with lenders demanding ever higher interest rates from several countries with higher debt levels, deficits and current account deficits. Splitting the sample before and after January 1, 2010 would be approximately appropriate for the structural break. In section 5, we will show that alternative sample splits will not change the essential results in the paper.
Defining deviations from the CIP condition between the Euro and currency j (j = the Sterling pound and the Danish kroner) in period t by Dev t (j) , the following analysis examines what factors explain Dev t (j) in the GFC and in the Euro crisis. By using daily data for the two sub-samples, we estimate the following equation:
for j = the Sterling pound and the Danish kroner.
We calculate the dependent variable by Dev t (j) ≡ (1+i j rates that measure market participants' expected average policy rate over the relevant term. Dev t (j) thus reflects secured arbitrage that removes many of the counter-party credit risks. The unit is basis point. The spot exchange rates and three-month forward exchange rates used in the analysis are their interbank middle rates at 4pm in London time. The data are downloaded from Datastream.
The right hand side of (1) includes three types of risk measures in addition to the constant term. The first is Credit t (h) which is a credit risk measure in currency h (h = the US dollar, the Euro, the Sterling pound, and the Danish kroner) in period t. In the crises, term premiums in the international money market became heterogeneous across currencies. In particular, due to the role of the US dollar as international liquidity, traders were especially sensitive to a liquidity shortage of the US dollar in international transactions. The first type of measure is included in (1) to capture such currency-specific risk. We explore whether local currency risk and global currency risk had different impacts in the two subsample periods.
The second is Credit t (q) which is a credit risk measure in country q (q = the United States, UK, EU, Ireland, and Denmark) in period t. In the GFC, the credit quality of European, UK, and US banks deteriorated substantially. In contract, in the Euro crisis, soared sovereign risk hit mainly European banks. This suggests that credit risk had country-specific features in the two crises which may be captured by Credit t (q). We explore whether different country risk had different impacts in the two subsample periods.
The third is Market t which is a global market risk measure in period t. For the measure, we use the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) which is a popular measure of the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options. A high value corresponds to a more volatile market and therefore, more costly options. Often referred to as the fear index, the VIX represents a measure of the market's expectation of volatility over the next 30-day period. We explore whether the global market risk had different impacts in the two subsample periods.
In the financial turmoil, some traders are not given as much "balance sheet" to invest, which is perceived as a shortage of liquidity to them. Under this situation, the traders are reluctant to expose their funds during a period of time where the funds might be needed to cover their own shortfalls. Consequently, in the crisis, foreign exchange markets come under stress, and bid-ask spreads may be widened in the markets. The three risk measures may capture such financial market tightness in each currency and in each country. Mollenkamp and Whitehouse [2008] ). When the measurement errors exist, the estimated coefficient will be less significant in the first sub-sample period. 4 The daily OIS rates are quoted in different time zones depending on their currency denomination. But since their daily changes are very small, it is unlikely that the time difference affect the spreads. denomination, the turbulence in the short-term money markets was more serious in the GFC than in the Euro crisis. In the GFC, traders who were not given as much "balance sheet" to invest faced a serious shortage of liquidity. Larger and more volatile spreads in the first sub-sample period reflect such a feature in the GFC.
Basic Statistics of Various Risk Measures
The contrast between the first and the second sub-sample periods was especially conspicuous in the US dollar and the Sterling pound. The mean of the spreads in the US dollar which was close to 80 basis points for the first sub-sample dropped to about 20 basis points for the second sub-sample period. The mean in the Sterling pound which exceeded 90 basis points for the first sub-sample dropped to less than 30 basis points for the second sub-sample period. The sharply increased money market credit risk in the two currencies was relatively stabilized in the Euro crisis.
The mean of the Euro-denominated spreads also dropped significantly for the second sub-sample period. However, the spreads of the Euro, which were smaller than those of the US dollar and the Sterling pound for the first sub-sample, became larger for the second sub-sample. The Euro which was a relatively safe currency in the GFC became a relatively risky currency in the Euro crisis.
Among the European currencies, the Swiss franc had the smallest spread for both of the two sub-sample periods. This was partly because the data of the Swiss franc denominated spreads is available only after November 17, 2008. But on the whole, the Swiss franc was less risky currency in the money markets during the two crises. In contrast, the Danish kroner's spread remained high throughout the two sub-sample periods. The Danish kroner suffered from increased risk premium in the money markets during the two crises.
Country-specific credit risk
To measure the country-specific credit risk Credit t (q), the following analysis uses the credit default swap (CDS) prices for country q at 4pm in London time.. Since credit risk was conspicuous in banking sector, we use the daily time series of the five-year banks sector CDS indexes for EU, the United Kingdom, and the United States. To capture sovereign credit risk, we also use the daily time series of the five-year sovereign CDS for Ireland, Italy, and Denmark. The data is downloaded from Datastream, which is based on CMA Data Vision. 
Estimation Results
This section reports our empirical results concerning the effects of various risk measures on the CIP deviations of the Sterling pound and the Danish kroner from the Euro. In each regression we use daily data for each of the two sub-sample periods: from January 2, 2008 to December 30, 2009 and from January 2, 2010 to March 28, 2013. The unit of each interest rate is basis point. We run OLS regressions for equation (1) with two lagged dependent variables. To be synchronized with the dependent variable, the country-specific credit risk Credit t (q) and the currency-specific liquidity risk Table 4 . It shows that several credit risk measures had significant effects on the CIP deviations of the Sterling pound and those of the Danish kroner. However, many of the risk measures had different significance levels and different signs for the two sub-sample periods, suggesting structural breaks before and after the Euro crisis. We also found some asymmetry between the Sterling pound and the Danish kroner.
Currency-specific credit risk
Regarding currency-specific credit risk measures, most of them had significant impact only in the first sub-sample period. In the first sub-sample period, the Euro-denominated spread (i.e., LIBOR-OIS spread) had a significantly positive effect on the deviations both in the Sterling pound and in the Danish kroner. The pound-denominated spread had a significantly negative effect on the Sterling pound's deviations, and so did the kroner-denominated spread on the Danish kroner's deviations. The symmetric results indicate that in the GFC, markets were very sensitive to a liquidity shortage of the Euro and that an increase in currency-specific credit risk made the currency's liquidity tighter and decreased its secured interest rate on the forward contract. The US dollar-denominated spread had a significantly negative effect only for the Sterling pound's deviations. Global liquidity shortage after the Lehman shock made not only the US dollar interest rate but also the Sterling pound interest rate lower on the forward contract, suggesting that the Sterling pound was a substitute for the US dollar in the international money markets.
In contrast, in the second sub-sample period, none of the currency-specific credit risk measures were significant in any estimation. This may reflect the fact that the turbulence in the short-term money markets was more serious in the GFC than in the Euro crisis. Coordinated monetary policies by central banks might also have contributed to reducing liquidity risk in the international money markets in the second sub-sample period.
It is noteworthy that even the Euro-denominated spreads were significant neither in the 
Robustness test
Until the last section, we have examined what determined the CIP deviations before and after the beginning of January 2012. The separate estimation results for the two sub-sample periods showed substantial structural changes in the coefficients. For example, the Chow Breakpoint test F-statistics in each equation is 5.51 and 6.40 for the Sterling pound and 9.48 and 9.88 for the Danish kroner, all of which reject the hypothesis that there is no structural break at 1% significance level.
However, since there is no consensus on when the GFC ended and when the Euro crisis began, the choice of the sub-samples was arbitrary.
The purpose of this section is to explore how the use of alternative subsample periods may change the essential results in the last section. In the analysis, we apply the Bai- Dividing the sample period based into three sub-sample periods based on the identified break dates, we run OLS regressions for equation (1). Except for the sub-sample periods, the estimation method and the data set are exactly the same as those in the last section. Table 5 reports the estimation results for the new sub-samples. Although the sub-sample periods are different, the basic messages in the previous sections hold true even in the new sub-sample periods. That is, most of the currency-specific credit risk measures are statistically significant only in the GFC (that is, the first and the second sub-sample periods), while EU banks' credit risk measures had significant but asymmetric impacts on the Sterling pound and the Danish kroner in the Euro crisis (that is, the third sub-sample period).
Regarding the country-specific credit risk measures, the coefficients of Euro-specific and local currency-specific measures had the same sign as those in the last section in the first sub-sample period. This is consistent with our view that money market risk explains the CIP deviations in the GFC. In the second sub-sample period, the result essentially held in the Danish kroner but did not hold in the Sterling pound. This may suggest that the turbulence in the GFC was stabilized earlier in the Sterling pound than in the other European currencies. In the third sub-sample period, almost all of the currency-specific credit risk measures became insignificant in both of the two currencies. As in the last section, the result supports the view that money market risk became less important in explaining the CIP deviations in the Euro crisis.
Regarding the country-specific measures, the coefficient of EU banks' credit risk was significantly positive in the Danish krone in the first sub-sample period. However, it was not significant in the second-sub sample period, which is consistent with the result in the last section.
More importantly, the coefficient of EU banks' credit risk had significant but opposite sign in the Sterling pound and the Danish kroner in the third sub-sample period. This supports our view that a rise of European banking crisis had opposite effects on the Sterling pound and on the Danish kroner in the Euro crisis. Compared with those in Table 4 , the other country-specific risks had a tendency to be significant in Table 5 . In particular, the effect of Irish CDS became very significant in both of the two currencies in the second sub-sample period. This may reflect the fact that that the second sub-sample period is a transition period from the GFC.
Concluding Remarks
Financial crises increase various premiums in national and regional financial markets. But unlike medium-or long-term financial markets, liquidity shortage became vital in financial turmoil. In the post Lehman period, the interest rate of the US dollar became low on the forward contract because of its role as international currency. However, in the Euro crisis, that of the Sterling pound became equally low, while those of the other European currencies such as the Danish kroner increased their liquidity premium. In this paper, we examined why the Sterling pound and the Danish kroner had shown such asymmetric features in the two crises. The regression results suggested that there was a structural break in the determinants of deviations from covered interest parity (CIP) condition during the crises. In particular, we found that strong Sterling pound in the Euro crisis has emerged through substituting Euro's role as an international liquidity.
It was in late 2009 when fears of a sovereign debt crisis developed among investors concerning Greece's ability to meet its debt obligations due to strong increase in government debt levels. This led to a crisis of confidence, indicated by a widening of bond yield spreads and the cost of risk insurance on credit default swaps in several European countries such as Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain. However, the effects of the crisis were not symmetric across European currencies.
For the Danish kroner, its tight linkage to Euro is critical in the regional transactions. Even in a turbulent period, there was a "flight to quality" to the US dollar and the Euro, which lowered their interest on forward contract. However, in a turbulent period, we could also observe a "flight to quality" to the Sterling pound. This was particularly conspicuous when the Euro crisis occurred. This may suggest that the Sterling pound is still a strong currency when the Euro becomes a weak currency. 2) t-value is in the parentheses. *** = 1% significance level, ** = 5% significance level, * = 10% significance level. t-value is in the parentheses. *** = 1% significance level, ** = 5% significance level, * = 10% significance level. 
